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Introduction
The branch of philosophy known as “philosophy of mind,” at its core, is concerned with two 
closely related questions: What sort of thing is a mind or mental state? And how are these 
related to the non-mental? We know some of the characteristic activities of minds: thinking, 
remembering, dreaming, imagining, etc. We consider certain types of things to be mental, 
i.e., to exist only in minds, as mental “states” or properties, or “mental contents”: thoughts,
memories, desires, emotions, and what philosophers refer to as “qualia” (that aspect of an
experience that one refers to by the phrase “what it is like to undergo it”). We also consider
certain kinds of things to be non-mental, such as rocks, tables, and rain drops. These do
not have minds, do not constitute minds, and cannot exist in minds as mental states or
properties. Minds, and the states they can undergo, are mental; things that cannot be minds
and cannot be undergone by minds are non-mental.
But is there a third category of thing, that can exist either inside or outside of minds? 
Consider the question of how communication is possible between minds. Warren Weaver, one 
of the pioneers of mathematical communication theory, defined communication in mental 
terms as “all of the procedures by which one mind may affect another” (1949: 2). At least 
in some instances, communication might be described as a process whereby the contents of 
mental states (such as thoughts or hopes) can be sent from one mind to another. In order for 
this to occur, there must be some medium by which the contents are conveyed – by which the 
mental contents are able to be sent between minds; naturalistic philosophers do not believe 
that a semantic content can merely float in space-time by itself, or that the contents of mental 
states can jump immediately from one mind to another without crossing some type of non-
mental medium. These “contents,” of course, are not strictly speaking mental contents when 
they are being conveyed outside of a mind; instead of residing in a mind, they reside within 
(or as it is usually put, are “carried by” or “tokened by”) non-mental vehicles. ‘Vehicle’ is a 
term used by Dennett (1969) to refer to any given manifestation of a content; the vehicle 
makes it possible for the content to be tokened (instantiated) at a given place and time. Such 
vehicles might include black ink on a page, or patterns of electricity running along a wire. 
We also have a word to refer to such tokenized contents while they are being conveyed from 
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place to place, or even when they are being stored or processed outside of minds: information. 
Information is here being understood broadly, as that which has a vehicle and a content.
A further prefatory terminological clarification is in order. The concepts of informational 
content and vehicle are also closely related to the concept of representation. Sometimes authors 
use the term ‘representation’ to refer to the relation that holds between any vehicle and its 
content. Others restrict its use to the relation holding for a particular category of these, and 
still others use it to refer to either the content or the vehicle standing in such a relationship. 
The following remarks by Dretske are pertinent here:
There are representational vehicles – the objects, events, or conditions that 
represent – and representational contents – the conditions or situations the vehicle 
represents as being so. In speaking about representations, then, we must be clear 
whether we are talking about content or vehicle, about what is represented or the 
representation itself. It makes a big difference. In the case of mental representations, 
the vehicle (a belief or an experience) is in the head. Content – what is believed and 
experienced – is (typically) not. … When I speak of representations I shall always 
mean representational vehicle. 
(2003: 68)
There is a large debate about the nature of the representation relation and how it is (conceptually 
or otherwise) related to content. Here, we wish to largely sidestep this debate; we will simply 
follow Dretske in using ‘representation’ as synonymous with ‘representational vehicle’ and 
we will consider representations to be one species of vehicle, possibly among others.
We also wish to sidestep the internalism/externalism debate about mental content. The 
issue of whether some mental content is “outside the head” is independent of the vehicle/
content distinction. Even if mental contents are themselves mind-external, or if they are 
fixed by mind-external facts, we can still make sense of those contents being communicated 
to another mind, or of the mental vehicles in another mind taking up that same content. 
Either way, such a process may involve this content being encoded and transmitted by means 
of mind-external informational vehicles.
Communication, control, and computation
Karl Pribram has claimed that information is a notion that is “neutral to the mind/brain 
dichotomy” (1986: 507). As such, it can be a powerful bridge principle in philosophy of 
mind’s quest to answer the questions about the identity of the mental and the relation 
between the mental and the non-mental. But it is a bridge that has only become available in 
the last century or so as a result of the development of technologies for sending, generating, 
processing, storing, and consuming information. These advancements created the practical 
need, in the mid-twentieth century, for scientific theories of communication (e.g., Shannon 
1948), control (e.g., Wiener 1948), and computation (e.g., Turing 1936).
Communication
With the advent of the telegraph and telephone as technologies for transmitting messages, 
questions arose as to the requirements for reliable transmission. Pioneers in the field of 
mathematical communication theory such as Harry Nyquist, R. V. Hartley, and Claude Shannon 
realized the need for exact measurement of information transmission capacity, regardless of the 
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specific technology involved. In doing so they abstracted away from the semantic interpretation 
of the messages themselves and introduced the crucial conceptual distinction between semantic 
meaning (sometimes referred to as “semantic information;” see Chapter 6) and the statistically 
quantifiable reduction of uncertainty that is achieved in a given communication process. 
By isolating the latter, important mathematical results from thermodynamics and statistical 
mechanics could be applied directly to problems faced by communications engineers.1
Shannon’s (1948) mathematical communication theory (which many authors simply refer 
to as information theory; see Chapter 4) was very influential on scientists and philosophers, 
including those mentioned in the following sections. In particular, it helped convince them 
that informational processes are as much at home in a purely naturalistic theory as any physical 
phenomena. It is no surprise that the most influential philosophical treatment of information, 
Dretske’s 1981, discussed in a later section, draws heavily from Shannon’s work.
Control
An important use of information is to enable one system to control another system. A basic 
but highly potent form of control is negative feedback, whereby the activity of a system is 
corrected in light of information received back by the system about the results of the activity. 
For example, as you move towards a target you acquire information about the discrepancy 
between your current location and the target and use that to correct your motion. The 
potency of negative feedback was independently recognized in engineering and in biology. 
A particularly prominent mechanical engineering example was James Watt’s invention in 
the 1780s of the centrifugal governor (Figure 28.1) to control the speed of a steam engine. 
When the flywheel turned too fast, centrifugal force would cause the angle arms attached to 
Figure 28.1 Watt’s centrifigual governor for a steam engine
Source: Reproduced from J. Farey, A Treatise on the Steam Engine: Historical, Practical, and Descriptive 
(London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1827)
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a spindle to extend up and out and, via a linkage mechanism, close the valve. When it moved 
too slowly, the arms would drop and cause the valve to open.
In biology, Claude Bernard, in attempting to answer the challenge of vitalists who thought 
that only a non-physical force could explain the ability of organisms to resist destruction by 
physical processes, introduced the idea that organisms maintain the constancy of their internal 
environment by responding to conditions that disrupt them, a process Walter Cannon termed 
homeostasis. Drawing upon his own use of negative feedback in designing targeting systems 
for weapons, as well as Cannon’s application of negative feedback in explaining how animals 
maintain homeostasis, Norbert Wiener (1948) elevated the principle of negative feedback to 
a general design principle for achieving control in both biology and engineering. He coined 
the term cybernetics to describe this framework and inspired an interdisciplinary movement 
involving mathematicians, engineers, neurophysiologists, and psychologists, among others, 
devoted to understanding the control of activities through negative feedback.
Computation
The term computation originally applied to the activity of humans in computing sums by 
applying rules to symbols written on a page. Given the tediousness of the activity, there has 
been a long history of humans attempting to automate the process. An important milestone 
was Charles Babbage’s design of the difference engine to compute polynomial functions, 
and the analytical engine, which could be programmed by punched cards to execute any 
computation. Babbage did not succeed in building either of these devices. Alan Turing (1936) 
proposed an extremely simple machine that could be configured to compute any function. It 
consists of an indefinitely long tape on which a string of symbols (e.g., 0s and 1s) are written 
and a read/write device that can move along the tape while reading from it or writing to it. 
The read/write device can enter into a finite number of states and has rules specifying what 
to do when, in a given state, it reads a particular symbol from the tape. A Turing machine (as 
it came to be called; see Chapters 7 and 10) is not practical for actual computing, but in 
the decade after Turing’s theoretical work he and several others created the first electronic 
computers. John von Neumann developed the architecture that has become standard in 
contemporary computers and developed a means of encoding programs (representations) 
that specify operations to be performed on other representations.
Cognitive science and the cognitive revolution in psychology
In recognition of the generality of their application to domains other than the mind, we have 
introduced the concepts of communication, control, and computation without reference 
to how they were applied to the mind. But for many pioneers developing these concepts, 
understanding the mind was an important goal. It is important to emphasize that characterizing 
what goes on in the mind as comparable to what goes on in communication between people, 
employing processes like those that had been developed for the control of physical systems and 
computation in physical machines, was a major conceptual development. This was facilitated 
by the fact that information was not itself characterized in terms of the physical medium in 
which it was implemented. The recognition of the import of these ideas for philosophy of 
mind was mediated by developments in the empirical science of psychology and the developing 
interdisciplinary cluster that eventually became known as cognitive science.
Empirical inquiries into both brain and mind developed in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries independently of the information-theoretical perspective. 
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Pioneering research in the brain sciences involved the discovery that neurons are distinct 
cells that conduct electrical signals and deployed techniques such as lesioning and 
microstimulation to link brain regions with behavioral activities. Psychology developed as 
a distinct discipline employing a variety of different approaches to study of the mind – act 
psychology (Brentano), functional psychology (James), structuralist psychology (Wundt, 
Titchener), cultural-historical psychology (Vygotsky, Luria), Gestalt psychology (Köhler), 
and genetic epistemology (Piaget). In part due to the lack of a clear framework for objectively 
characterizing activity in the mind, in North America these various fledgling approaches to 
psychology were overtaken by John Watson and other behaviorists who sought to make the 
new discipline appropriately empirical by bypassing the mind altogether and focusing on 
behavior. It might be said that, in rejecting the project of going inside the mind, behaviorism 
impeded the development of an information-theoretic understanding of mind. But William 
Aspray suggests that, in another respect, behaviorism actually fostered the development:
Behaviorist psychology, by concentrating on behavior and not consciousness, 
helped to break down the distinction between the mental behavior of humans and 
the information processing of lower animals and machines. This step assisted the 
acceptance of a unified theory of information processors, whether in humans or 
machines. 
(1985: 128)
Physiological psychologists were among the first to draw upon information-theoretical 
ideas of computation and control. Neurophysiologist Warren McCulloch began a 
collaboration with Walter Pitts, a self-trained logician, that began by showing how idealized 
neurons could, when appropriately networked, implement all the connectives of sentential 
logic, and by extension could be viewed as carrying out any operation of which a Turing 
machine was capable (McCulloch and Pitts 1943). In subsequent work they moved beyond 
viewing brain activity as implementing sentential logic, and focused on statistical properties 
of networks that would allow them to recognize related stimuli as the same. They also began 
to relate their networks to the architecture of specific brain regions, a project that was soon 
taken up by other researchers such as David Marr.
Psychophysics, which addressed questions such as the relation between the magnitude of 
a stimulus and the psychological experience of the stimulus, was another field of psychology 
that was not dominated by behaviorism in North America and it was in Stevens’ psychophysics 
laboratory at Harvard that George Miller invoked information theory in his dissertation 
research on radio jamming. To present his classified research to a wider audience, he shifted 
the focus to how noise affects the intelligibility of speech and asking why some messages 
are more robust to noise (a phenomenon Shannon [1948] himself went on to explicate in 
terms of the redundancy between parts of a message). Initially Miller tried to situate his 
work within the context of behaviorism using the label ‘statistical behavioristics,’ but he 
quickly moved beyond the bounds of behaviorism and began to speak of cognition. His work 
remained influenced by information theory and one of his most cited papers (Miller 1956) 
was an investigation of the capacity limits affecting cognitive performance (e.g., limits to 
the information that can be stored in short-term memory). In a landmark book he, together 
with Karl Pribram and Eugene Galanter (1960), addressed purposive action and developed a 
computational conception of how agents could execute plans through a process of comparing 
a representation of the current state with that of a goal and implementing operations until no 
differences remained between the representations.
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Miller was not alone in applying information-theoretic perspectives to understanding the 
mind. Donald Broadbent, for example, investigated how people are able to focus their attention 
on a particular conversation, but quickly shift to tracking a different conversation if they hear 
their own name. Broadbent invoked the notions of information channels and filtering to explain 
such phenomena. By the late 1960s the range of research approaches applying information-
theoretic ideas to understanding the mind reached a sufficient threshold that a new name was 
coined for this form of psychology – cognitive psychology. Ulric Neisser, in the book that gave this 
name to the new field, summarizes the importance of information to it:
There were cognitive theorists long before the advent of the computer. Bartlett, 
whose influence on my own thinking will become obvious in later chapters, is a case 
in point. But, in the eyes of many psychologists, a theory which dealt with cognitive 
transformations, memory schemata, and the like was not about anything. One could 
understand theories that dealt with overt movements, or with physiology; one could 
even understand (and deplore) theories which dealt with the content of consciousness; 
but what kind of a thing is a schema? If memory consists of transformations, what 
is transformed? So long as cognitive psychology literally did not know what it was 
talking about, there was always a danger that it was talking about nothing at all. This 
is no longer a serious risk. Information is what is transformed, and the structured 
pattern of its transformations is what we want to understand. 
(1967: 8)
Appropriately, an alternative name for the field is information-processing psychology.
Psychology and neuroscience were not the only disciplines that began to employ 
information-theoretic ideas to explain mental phenomena in the 1950s. Linguistics, like 
psychology, had been dominated by behaviorism, but linguists such as Zellig Harris soon 
took up the challenge of characterizing the vast range of syntactic forms available in language 
that they confronted. To bring coherence to the range of forms, a framework was introduced 
in which the different syntactic forms were arrived at by applying formal operations to symbol 
strings. Harris, for example, hypothesized transformations of kernel sentences to account for 
passive and active versions of a sentence. This approach was further developed by Harris’ 
student Noam Chomsky, who not only developed a number of transformational grammars 
in the attempt to account for the forms possible in actual languages, but also demonstrated 
that such grammars required computational power equivalent to a Turing machine.
During this period as well some pioneers in the new field of computer science began to 
explore whether an appropriately configured computer could be intelligent and established the 
subfield of artificial intelligence (see Chapters 10 and 11). Especially noteworthy was Newell 
and Simon’s (1956) program Logic Theorist, which constructed proofs, some of them novel, 
of theorems from Principia Mathematica. In subsequent decades these researchers focused on 
developing a general approach to problem solving and created a programming architecture 
known as a production system that was particularly useful for implementing programs designed 
to mimic human intelligence (Newell and Simon 1972). The representations used in 
production systems are modeled on propositions in language and the approach is generally 
referred to as symbolic AI. Other theorists found propositional representations to be too 
inflexible to account for cognitive abilities and developed larger-scale knowledge structures 
known as schemas or scripts, or broke altogether from symbolic approaches and pursued a 
more neutrally inspired architecture in which the fundamental activity is not application of 
rules but recognition of patterns through parallel constraint satisfaction.
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Although the name cognitive science would not be introduced until the 1970s, these efforts 
in linguistics, psychology, artificial intelligence, and neuroscience provided the foundation for 
what became a highly productive interdisciplinary endeavor.2 As the applications of information-
theoretic approaches were being developed in these various disciplines, philosophers, especially 
Hillary Putnam and Jerry Fodor, drew upon them in articulating a new philosophical stance 
on the nature of mind (for an overview, see Bechtel 1988). In the early twentieth century, 
dualism and identity theory seemed to be the only live options for characterizing mind: mental 
states either involved a non-material substance or were identical to material states such as brain 
processes. To capture the ways the new cognitive disciplines invoked informational states and 
operations on them, Putnam and Fodor introduced what came to be known as functionalism, 
according to which mental states are states in an information-processing system that might 
be realized in different physical processes (and thus, are not identical with any of them). The 
theorists to whom we turn in the next section all worked within this functionalist perspective.
Information enters philosophy of mind
As it was brought into philosophy of mind, the notion of information became intertwined 
with other concepts that already had a long history of use by philosophers. First, information 
is closely related to another concept that has enjoyed prominence in philosophical discussions 
since the time of the Ancient Greeks: knowledge. Second, the notions of mental contents, mental 
representations, and ideas had been central to philosophy of mind since the seventeenth century 
(see Allen 2013 for an overview). Third, the notion of information has become highly relevant 
to the problem of intentionality, which was given its modern formulation by nineteenth-century 
philosopher Franz Brentano. Fourth, at the beginning of the twentieth century Frege articulated 
his highly influential distinction between sense and reference that provided an account of meaning 
in non-mental terms. The task of integrating the notion of information arising from scientific 
fields with these preexisting philosophical notions has proved to be far from trivial.
We turn first to the problem of intentionality. Brentano had claimed that intentionality was 
the mark of the mental – mental states are about other states, including ones that do not exist. 
Because it might lack a relatum, Brentano characterized intentionality not as a true relation but 
as relation-like. Some philosophers turned to information theory for suggestions: if the mind 
processes information, then perhaps that could explain the content of mental states. However, 
as we noted above, Shannon’s formal treatment of communication did not address how 
communicated messages carried information; he simply treated it as a basic fact that “frequently 
the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated according to some system 
with certain physical or conceptual entities” (1948: 379). Shannon himself reserved the term 
information for the reduction of uncertainty that was crucial for his analysis of communication.
The two senses of information, however, were often conflated. The use of information-
bearing states or representations in psychological and AI theories suggests that these accounts 
can explain the semantic sense of information. In a particularly influential paper, John Searle 
(1980) argued that such attempts confound the crucial distinction between intrinsic and derived 
intentionality: any meaning or aboutness that a message, state in a computer, signal running 
across a wire, etc. can have is dependent on the minded beings that give a message meaning or 
respond to it. Searle emphasized that the same applies to symbol strings in a computer – they 
are dependent for their meaning on the programmer. Trying to ground the aboutness of mental 
states in semantic information, goes Searle’s argument, is putting the cart before the horse: the 
aboutness of information is itself grounded in those mental states. Not all philosophers have 
accepted Searle’s contention that intentionality must be dependent on minds. The theories 
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we discuss next can be looked at as attempts to respond to this line of argument by advancing 
accounts of the intrinsic aboutness of information in non-mental terms.3
Dretske
Perhaps because Shannon’s specialized usage of the term ‘information’ – i.e., to refer to the 
amount of reduction of uncertainty about the occurrence of potential events that may be 
afforded by a signal – had become widespread by the 1950s, many philosophers who have 
been concerned with accounting for intentionality have tended to use the terms ‘content’ and 
‘representation’ with much greater frequency. Dretske (1981), however, advanced an account, 
built on the foundation of Shannon’s sense of reducing uncertainty, of semantic content. 
Important for understanding the relation between Dretske’s theory and Shannon’s is that instead 
of using ‘information’ to mean something distinct from content, as Shannon did, Dretske used 
‘information’ to mean something distinct from representation. This was a distinction between 
kinds of vehicles: information carriers (he also used the term ‘indicators’) versus representations.
Instead of treating a cognitive agent as the sender of a message, he treated objects or 
events in the world as the sender and the cognitive agent as the receiver (Adams 2003: 472). 
Hence, he treated communication as a causal process but instead of thinking of the effect 
as a message that carries the same information as the cause (drawing from Grice’s earlier 
notion of natural meaning) Dretske viewed the effect as carrying information about the cause. 
Being an epistemologist, the account was also well-suited to his goal of accounting for 
knowledge: on his view, knowledge was the result of the flow of information from the world 
into the knowing subject (Dretske 1981). This set the basic framework of Dretske’s account, 
but he recognized several ways in which causation by itself was insufficient to account for 
cognitive states with specific contents. First, causes carry information about more things than 
what is usually taken to be the semantic content of the effect – for example, a cause carries 
information about all the intermediate steps in a causal chain. Dretske proposes to explicate 
this in terms of the direction of causal dependencies: “S gives primary representation to 
property B (relative to property g) = S’s representation of something’s being g depends on 
the informational relationship between B and g, but not vice versa” (1981: 160).4
Moreover, messages should be able to be mistakenly tokened without affecting their semantic 
content. Dretske (1981) appeals to the process of acquisition to explain this – as the causal 
linkage between sensory stimulus and the message internal to the cognitive agent develops, 
the internal message can be generated without the sensory stimulus. He later abandoned this 
view, however, in favor of a teleological view of representations as those content vehicles whose 
function it is to carry information about what is represented (Dretske 1988; a version of this view 
was advocated earlier by Millikan 1984; see also Chapter 22). Dretske does not believe that his 
appeal to function prevents his theory from achieving his goal of grounding aboutness “in an 
objective, mind- (and language-) independent notion of information” (2009: 381):
What is important for the purposes of information-theoretic semantics is that 
there be a set of circumstances, or perhaps a kind of history, that, independent 
of human interests, grounds descriptions of animals and their parts as ill, sick, 
broken, damaged, injured, diseased, defective, flawed, infected, contaminated, or 
malfunctioning. If the truth of these descriptions is independent of our interests 
and purposes, then there is a way natural systems are supposed to be, or supposed 
to behave, that is independent of how we conceive them.
(Dretske 2009: 387)
Information-theoretic philosophy of mind
355
The most common criticism of Dretske’s theory poses what is known as the “disjunction 
problem.” In a case of misrepresentation, a content vehicle A, whose function it is to indicate 
B, instead indicates C (by being caused by state of affairs C instead of state of affairs B). If 
A-tokens occasionally carry information C, then in virtue of what is it true that the function 
of A is to indicate condition B, rather than the disjunctive condition B-or-C? Dretske’s 
theory must be able to give an answer to this that does not itself rely on human purposes and 
intentions in order to account for misrepresentation. A large literature has been devoted to 
this problem; see a recent discussion of it in Dretske (2009: 387–9).
MacKay
Other information-based approaches to semantic content began not with the mathematical 
theory of communication but with the cyberneticists’ conception of negative feedback as 
enabling physical systems to be goal-directed by taking in information about the effects of 
their actions in determining new actions. Donald MacKay characterizes information as “that 
which alters” an agent’s “total state of readiness for adaptive or goal-directed activity” (1969: 
60).5 This approach, as further developed in the work of Dennett, treats information not quite 
as mind-independent but as in fact dependent on the (implicit or explicit) goals of the animal:
since a stimulus, as a physical event, can have no intrinsic significance but only what 
accrues to it in virtue of the brain’s discrimination, the problem-ridden picture of 
a stimulus being recognized by an animal, meaning something to the animal, prior to 
the animal’s determining what to do about the stimulus, is a conceptual mistake. 
(Dennett 1969: 75–6)
MacKay argues that a message is only significant or meaningful insofar as receipt of the 
message would alter the conditional readiness of action. Behavior plays a key role in his account of 
intentionality, but he is clear about how his account is to be distinguished from behaviorism: 
“What has been affected by your understanding of [a] message is not necessarily what you do 
– as some behaviourists have suggested – but rather what you would be ready to do if given 
(relevant) circumstances arose” (1969: 22). The idea here is that mindedness, information, 
and goal-directedness are interdependent naturalistic phenomena. It is a physical fact about 
the animal that it has certain needs and certain capacities for acting to meet these needs, 
and is therefore motivated to act in certain ways under certain conditions. In virtue of such 
facts, stimuli become relevant to determining how to behave in virtue of information they 
carry about the effects of such behavior, and thereby acquire significance. For MacKay, this 
foundational significance ultimately underwrites the aboutness of information, and the 
aboutness of mental states, as a whole.
Sayre
In contrast to Dretske and MacKay, Kenneth Sayre proposes a process in which Shannon’s 
quantitative sense of information is turned into semantic information. He uses the term 
‘info(t)’ for the “technical” sense of information that Shannon’s theory focused on, i.e., 
that of reduction of uncertainty. ‘Info(s),’ on the other hand, denotes a signal that bears not 
merely a statistical significance but a genuine semantic content. His project is to show how 
info(t) can be transformed into info(s) and Sayre focuses on the visual system to show how 
this is done. An organism may use info(t) in order to get around and engage in adaptive 
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behavior on a limited basis, but much more adaptive behavior is possible with info(s), that is, 
when a state of the system has as its content the perceptual object.
Central to Sayre’s approach is his characterization of organisms in which info(s) states 
arise. He characterizes organisms as adapting to changes in their environment, either through 
evolution or learning, but more fundamentally, needing to do this because ultimately they 
are organized systems that must resist dissipation into their environment. In thermodynamic 
terms introduced by Schrödinger, living organisms are low entropy systems relative to their 
environment, and to maintain themselves as such, they must extract energy from their 
environment. Sayre quotes Schrödinger in describing “a living organism as a device ‘for sucking 
orderliness from its environment’” which Schrödinger characterized as negative entropy (1967: 
79, quoted in Sayre 1986: 128). In order to perform this crucial activity, organisms need not 
only a way of incorporating energy from outside themselves but also identifying sources of 
energy. They do this by receiving info(t) from distal objects at their senses.
The sensory processing system then generates info(s) as it selectively reduces info(t), 
extracting and retaining only info(t) about a distal object O that is relevant to the actions the 
organism takes with respect to O. It is by “locking onto” the dynamically changing info(t) 
that is relevant to responding behaviorally to object O, and so tracking O, that the organism 
generates info(s) that is about O. Looked at in this way, perception is not just a passive process 
of aligning internal states of the organism with external stimuli, but a process that organisms 
use to focus on objects in their environment with which they need to interact appropriately if 
they are to continue to live. At some points Sayre speaks of a “perceptual-behavioral control 
loop,” where the behavioral component initiates actions with respect to the object in the 
environment about which the perceptual system carried info(t). It is through such loops that 
the info(t) states become info(s) states – they become states the organism uses to engage with 
the external object. What underlies this transformation is that organisms are active systems 
that can alter processes such as perception so as to provide the appropriate info(t) for engaging 
in successful actions in the world. As we will see below, this approach foreshadowed to some 
extent the later approach of Neo-Gibsonians such as Chemero, who have embraced non-
representational information-processing accounts of perception.
The many facets of information in philosophy of mind
Informational theories of intentionality were vigorously debated through the 1990s but 
interest in the problem has waned since then. Although not couched in information-theoretic 
terms, recent philosophical discussions of intentionality and vehicles have significant 
implications for information-theoretic accounts. Accordingly, we discuss some more recent 
developments in philosophy of mind and their relevance to the topic of information.
The topic of the nature of intentionality/aboutness has itself grown to be very large and 
contentious, and has recently been the focus of in-depth investigation (e.g., Crane 2013; Yablo 
2014). One important upshot is the recognition that there are a number of kinds of aboutness; this 
implies that for purposes of philosophy of mind, there is a corresponding sense of ‘information 
content’ for each of these kinds. For example, “A carries information about B” might mean that 
A refers to B (i.e., by indicating that B is present), or that B enters into the meaning of A (for 
example, A might be a story about B, a fictional or even a logically contradictory object). The 
former case invokes an extensional type of aboutness, the latter an intensional type. Information 
content can therefore be broken down into intensional and extensional content.
As an illustration of further ways to divide aboutness, consider Martin Davies’ distinction 
between “subdoxastic aboutness” and other kinds of aboutness:
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Subdoxastic aboutness is distinct from attitude aboutness since, like experiential 
aboutness, it is a kind of non-conceptualised content. (Indeed, it is between those 
two kinds of non-conceptualised content that Evans (1982: 158) distinguishes 
in terms of serving ‘as the input to a thinking, concept-applying, and reasoning 
system’.) Subdoxastic aboutness is distinct from linguistic aboutness since it is not 
derived. Subdoxastic aboutness is also distinct from indicator aboutness, since it 
allows for the possibility of misrepresentation. We can say, for example, that a state 
of the auditory processing system represents the presence of a sound coming from 
the left even though there is not in fact any sound coming from the left. And finally, 
subdoxastic aboutness is quite unlike experiential aboutness – the fourth variety of 
aboutness – since it is not tied to consciousness. 
(1995: 16)
One lesson to draw from this is that it may be an oversimplification to talk as if there is a 
single notion of “semantic information” (or info(s) in Sayre’s terminology).
A second point that is emerging from recent work in philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science involves the notion of a content vehicle. Philosophers have pointed out that vehicles 
also come in more than one kind. Dennett (1983) for example proposed that information 
may be manifested non-representationally in simple storage formats – “brute storage” in 
his words – which do not allow any kind of information processing during storage (only 
retrieval). Note that the question of what types of vehicles may exist is orthogonal to the 
question of what types of contents might exist.
This issue has come to the fore in recent debates about perception. Earlier proponents 
of ecological approaches such as James Gibson had argued against information-processing 
accounts of processes such as visual perception by maintaining that information needed for 
action (what he termed affordances) already existed in the light. Organisms merely need to 
pick up this information; they do not need to process it. What marks the approach of Neo-
Gibsonians such as Chemero (2009) is that it embraces Gibson’s non-representational direct 
realism, while acknowledging the importance of information processing. For Chemero 
there is no contradiction here because information processing in direct perception does not 
require representations in the mind, a point he also expresses by saying it does not require 
“computation” or “mental gymnastics”:
Action changes the information available to an animal’s perceptual systems, and 
sometimes the action actually generates information. Thus there is a sense in which 
perception-action as studied by radical embodied cognitive scientists involves 
information processing, but it is a variety of information processing that does not 
involve mental gymnastics.
(2009: 127)
Discussions about information often assume that all informational content is declarative. 
Another contribution of recent theorizing questions this. Not all messages communicated 
between people are assertions: they can also be imperative or interrogative, for example. 
Belnap (1990) has argued that the semantics of imperative and interrogative sentences cannot 
be analyzed in terms of assertoric content, and that truth or falsity would not be applicable 
to such sentences. Further, Belnap along with a number of other philosophers has proposed 
many-valued logics. These developments, as well as parallel advances in analog and non-
binary digital computation, point to the need for richer accounts of semantic information.
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Table 28.1 Five dimensions along which ways of counting something as “information” may vary
Facet of information Examples
Type of intensional content Conceptual/non-conceptual, linguistic, 
experiential, propositional, imagistic, symbolic/
non-symbolic, analog/digital
Type of vehicle Representation (understood various ways), 
affordance, mere carrier, brute storage
Content tokening scheme Causal covariation; statistical; biosemantics; 
teleosemantics; conceptual role semantics; 
Kantian categorical imposition; convention/
stipulation; gestalt structuring; natural vs non-
natural
Potential truth/satisfaction values None; true only; true or false; satisfaction 
(understood various ways); other possibilities
Type of extensional content Actual objects; possible objects; rigidly-
designated objects; real patterns; facts; relations; 
events; property instances; tropes; states of 
affairs; abstracta
Finally, for a piece of information to exist, a content token must become, as it were, 
attached to a vehicle token; they become informationally bound to one another. What are 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for this attachment to occur? Multiple answers are 
possible since there are many schemes under which such attachment might occur. A might 
mean B merely by arbitrary stipulation (as in games or stories), it might mean B by means of 
being linked causally to B in the right way (as in Dretske’s indication relation), or it might 
mean B by being historically linked in the right way (as in Millikan’s biosemantics). There 
is the possibility of natively endowed content, or (as a Kantian might be inclined to say) 
content imposed by a constitutive faculty of the mind. Each of these might be referred to 
as a distinct content tokening scheme: an ordering principle that determines which contents get 
tokened or “attached” to which vehicles and under what conditions.6 The issue of tokening 
schemes is importantly different from understanding the nature of content itself, a point 
that has also been made by Rick Grush: “a theory of content, by contrast, need not concern 
itself with how or why contents are carried by this or that vehicle – rather, it is concerned 
with what contents are” (1998). Providing a reductionistic account of what it is for A to be 
about B in one of Davies’ senses, for example, would not be the same thing as providing a 
reductionistic account of the potential schemes for tokening such contents.
Final reflections
This brief review reveals that philosophers of mind have adopted multiple perspectives 
on information. To make progress, future philosophical discussions of information need 
to acknowledge the multi-faceted nature of information and differentiate at least five 
dimensions (Table 28.1). If an account treats a physically real thing as a piece of information, 
it must address at least three questions: What is the intensional content? What is the vehicle? 
And what is the content tokening scheme? Depending on the type of information, it may 
need to address two further questions: What is its truth value? And what does it refer to in the 
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world (i.e., what is its extensional content)? As our brief review of philosophical approaches 
makes clear, not only are there multiple answers to each question, there are multiple categories 
of answers for each question. Continued cross-pollination between philosophy of mind and 
information-related fields will require both to acknowledge the interrelatedness and multi-
dimensionality of information-related notions.
Notes
 1 See Aspray (1985) for more details on these conceptual developments.
 2 For a historical account of the development of cognitive science, see Bechtel et al. (1998). Boden 
(2008) examines the various roles the notion of information has played in cognitive science. See 
also Chapter 26, this volume.
 3 The “symbol grounding problem,” discussed in Chapter 11, is a species of the more general 
problem of explaining the intentionality of informational states in non-mental terms. The 
“symbol grounding problem,” in particular, is focused on symbolic states such as those found in 
a computer, and those invoked in, e.g., Fodor’s “computational theory of mind.”
 4 Adams (2003: 491) notes the similarity of Dretske’s explanation to Fodor’s account of asymmetric 
dependence between a cognitive structure and what it means, but in Fodor’s account, the key 
connection is secured by the existence of a law connecting the referent with the message.
 5 Here MacKay’s view bears a resemblance to Floridi’s (2011, p. 164) “action-based semantics.”
 6 Grush (2002) uses the term ‘content assignation scheme’.
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